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ABSTRACT: This article focuses on the United Nations War Crimes Commission’s significant 
contribution to the development of customary international criminal law defined by the 
development of international legal standards and proceedings to combat impunity and promote 
justice. It draws on the Commission’s official history and its increasingly open archives in order 
to provide an overview of the UNWCC and its work, its members and its legacy for the 
contemporary era of international criminal law. The article firstly places the Commission in its 
historical context through the events and agreements that led to its creation and provided the legal 
character of the UNWCC. The defining characteristics of the Commission are afterwards 
described: the nations involved, the committee structure it formed and the sub-commission 
located in the Far East. Lastly, the accomplishments of the Commission are emphasised and 
criticisms of its work are presented. The article concludes with a discussion on the legacy of the 





In October 1943, as World War II raged on in Europe and Asia, representatives of seventeen 
Allied governments met at the UK Foreign Office in London to create a multilateral organization 
to mobilize international retributive justice efforts. These states were motivated by the need to 
create both a legal and a military response to what they saw as unprecedented atrocities being 
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committed against the military and civilian populations of the countries attacked by the Axis. On 
20 October 1943, the government representatives began formal discussions about the 
advancement of international criminal law and the standards of how to bring justice to the 
international community. The new organisation was called the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission (UNWCC) in line with a number of other civilian multinational organizations 
created in this period.1 By the time the UNWCC closed in March 1948, the Commissioners and 
their respective nations were responsible for making prima facie judgments on 36,000 cases put 
to the Commission by member states. These judgments resulted in over 2,000 criminal trials2 
conducted around Europe and the Far East before national military civil courts and tribunals. 
Furthermore, through the forum of the UNWCC, the Commissioners debated and voted on 
pressing issues of international criminal and humanitarian law. The standards and concepts 
agreed upon by the Commissioners were transmitted to member states that very often adopted the 
views of the Commission. The views of the Commission and its members also influenced the 
London Charter for the International Military Tribunal (IMT) in 1945. Viewed all together, the 
collaborative multilateral efforts that took place through the UNWCC between 1943 and 1948 
generated a significant contribution to the development of customary international criminal law 
defined by the development of international legal standards and proceedings to combat impunity 
and promote justice.3 
The efforts of the Commission and its members are largely overlooked and forgotten in a 
historical narrative that has long focused almost entirely on the IMT conducted at Nuremberg and 
Tokyo. From this perspective, the work of the Commission and the score of associated national 
and military tribunals constitute a new paradigm of customary international criminal law. 
                                                
1  In 1942 the Allies adopted the name ‘United Nations’ as the formal name for their alliance.  This action by the 
United Nations committed the powers fighting the Axis both to reject a separate peace and to a series of political 
objectives. These included a commitment “to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other 
lands”, 26-nation Declaration by United Nations, January 1942. For more background on the United Nations alliance 
and the creation of the UNWCC, see D. Plesch, America, Hitler and the UN (London, I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 2011), 
E. Schwelb, ‘The United Nations War Crimes Commission’ (1946) 23 British Yearbook of International Law 363, 
364 and A. J. Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg: Allied War Crimes Policy and the Question of Punishment, (Chapel 
Hill, University of  North Carolina Press,1998) chapter two.  
2 The United Nations War Crimes Commission (ed.), History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the 
Development of Laws of War (His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1948) 518. 
3 We discuss the relationship of the UNWCC to customary international law in our article Changing the Paradigm of 
International Criminal Law: Considering the Work of the United Nations War Crimes Commission of 1943 – 1948, 
15 The International Community Law Review 203-223. 
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This article draws on the Commission’s official history published in 19484, and its 
increasingly open archives in order to provide an overview of the UNWCC and its work, its 
members and its legacy for the contemporary era of international criminal law. We will first look 
at the historical context of the Commission through the events and agreements that led to its 
creation and provided the legal character of the UNWCC.  Following this overview, we describe 
the Commission through its defining characteristics: the nations involved, the committee 
structure it formed and the sub-commission located in the Far East. In the next section, we 
highlight the accomplishments of the Commission and criticisms of its work before concluding 
with a discussion on the legacy of its work and the future research agenda.   
 
II. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE UNWCC 
 
When the members of the Commission first began to work together in 1943, the representatives 
commonly referred to several established tenants of international law as they sought to establish 
legal ground for their work. These agreements and documents provided the legal precedent for 
the work of the UNWCC and the national trials. During the operations of the Commission, an 
internal legal committee worked continuously to expand and develop these already existing legal 
concepts.5 Among the agreements most cited by the Commission were the Hague Conventions of 
1899 and 1907. The Hague Conventions provide the first modern codification of actions in war 
that the member states considered should be regarded as illegal and marked significant progress 
in the development of international cooperation concerning the development of war crimes and 
laws of war.   
The Commission of Responsibilities of the Paris Peace Conference later accompanied the 
standards of The Hague Conventions at the end of World War I in 1919. While these efforts 
largely failed to meet their objective of dealing with issues of prosecution for war crimes 
committed during World War I, the Conference developed a further codification of thirty-two 
                                                
4 The United Nations War Crimes Commission (ed.), History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the 
Development of Laws of War was published in March 1948 by His Majesty's Stationary Office (History of the 
UNWCC). It was written by the members of the UNWCC and its secretarial staff with the purpose of recording the 
work of the Commission for study by future students and scholars of international law.   	  
5 The United Nations War Crimes Commission, Information Concerning Human Rights Arising from Trials of War 
Criminals, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/W.19 125 (15 May 1948) <http://www.unwcc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/UNWCCUN-HRs-Report.pdf>  . 
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acts that it considered to be war crimes.   Members of the UNWCC used this “Versailles List” 
from the Paris Peace Conference as both as legal precedent and also as inspiration for improving 
international efforts in this regard6.  
Indeed, despite the progress established by The Hague Conventions and the Paris Peace 
Conference, the state of international criminal law at the outbreak of the Second World War was 
complex and incomplete. The Commission provided one of the earliest descriptions of this 
context in a report for the UN Human Rights Division that was published in 1948 and restricted 
to public access until the late 1980s.7 This report detailed the Allied position from the perspective 
of the members of the Commission in an effort that describes the existing legal precedent at the 
time: 
War has been described as organized murder and desolation. But there was a question of 
great moment because of the rival contentions advanced on the two sides. One side, that of 
the Axis, asserted the absolute responsibility of belligerents, who, it was asserted, were under 
no obligation to respect human rights, but were entitled to trample them underfoot wherever 
the military forces found them inconvenient for the waging of war. This is the totalitarian war 
as envisaged by the Axis powers. This doctrine was repudiated as contrary not only to 
morality but to recognized international law which prescribed metes and bounds for the 
violation even in war of human rights. This latter doctrine involved also the further principle 
that there was individual responsibility for violations of human rights in war time, beyond the 
limits permitted by the law of war. The idea of individual responsibility, if it was to be 
conceived in terms of law involved a legal system and procedure, in order to decide the 
question of individual criminality. 8 
The standards of laws of war referred to by the Commission reflect their regard for international 
treaties and conventions established prior to World War II, specifically The Hague and Geneva 
Conventions and the Pact of Paris. However, the generality of the terms of these international 
enactments required further definition and strengthening to in order to be appropriately applied to 
the complex context faced by the Commission.   
                                                
6 UNWCC, 2d mtg. (2 December 1943), U.N.W.C.C. 3rd mtg. (9 December 1943) and UNWCC C 1, C 87 (1); See 
Information Concerning Human Rights Arising from Trials of War Criminals (n 1) 8, 146-180. 
7 Ibid., ii.   
8Ibid.  
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Public international statements condemning enemy atrocities and promising retribution 
also fuelled the creation of the legal and political work of the multilateral collaboration that later 
became the Commission. Representatives were also propelled by public opinion and civil society 
initiatives, notably the London International Assembly.9 Formal statements began in 1940 with 
the Czech and Polish governments releasing a joint statement in November concerning the 
unprecedented nature of Nazi atrocities.10 A statement from the Polish government was released 
shortly thereafter that informed the public about the Nazi attempt to eradicate Polish national 
identity.11 Following Czechoslovakia and Poland, Roosevelt and Churchill released parallel 
statements in October 1941 promising “retribution”. In his statement, Churchill emphasized that 
atrocities were occurring “above all behind the German fronts in Russia”. He continued by 
adding that retribution “[for] these crimes must henceforward take its place among the major 
purposes of the war”.12 While robust and judicial in tone, these statements did not make specific 
reference either to the plight of the Jews or to a legal process. The Soviet Foreign Ministry also 
issued notes on German atrocities to all nations it had diplomatic relations with in November 
1941 and again in 1942.13 These statements included descriptions of Nazi pogroms, particularly 
those at Lodz. 
The first multilateral statement setting out a judicial response to Nazi atrocities as an 
Allied war aim was released in January 1942. Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Free France, Greece, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Yugoslavia issued a joint statement on 
Punishment for War Crimes at St James’s Palace in London that was also promptly endorsed by 
China.14 The St. James Declaration stated: 
…whereas international solidarity is necessary in order to avoid the repression of these acts 
of violence simply by acts of vengeance on the part of the general public, and in order to 
satisfy the sense of justice of the civilised world…[the signatories] place among their 
                                                
9 See particularly, the contribution of C. Stahn include in this volume. 
10 ‘Czechoslovakia and Poland’, The Times (12 November 1940) 3. 
11 ‘German Crimes in Poland’, The Times (20 December 1940) 3. 
12 M.E. Bathurst, ‘The United Nations War Crimes Commission’, (1945) American Society of International Law, 
565-8. 
13 ‘German Atrocities (HMSO for the Soviet Embassy, London, 7 November and 6 January 1942) and The United 
Nations War Crimes Commission’, in History of the UNWCC (n 4). 
14T. Lie (then the Norwegian Foreign Minister and future first Secretary-General of the United Nations) was among 
the signatories. 
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principal war aims the punishment, through the channel of organised justice, of those guilty 
of or responsible for these crimes, whether they have ordered them, perpetrated them or 
participated in them…15  
General Wiadyslaw Sikorski, Prime Minister of Poland and Chairman of the Conference, 
explained that the practical purposes of the Declaration were to warn the enemy and offer a 
“glimmer of hope” to the peoples of occupied Europe. He stated bluntly that “the Declaration 
resolutely turns International Law in a new direction”.16  With the Declaration, the signatory 
states also brought attention to the issue of individual responsibility including command 
responsibility and collective (participatory) responsibility. Furthermore, the St James Declaration 
explicitly put the Axis on warning that they would face a judicial process.  
The British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, attended the meeting at St James’s Palace 
along with the US Ambassador and other allied representatives, but none of the Big Three were 
ready to endorse the policy.  All of the original signatory states were under enemy occupation. 
Their notable efforts demonstrated the explicit intent to bring the will of the international 
community to assist in maintaining civilised values and suppress the risk of lynch mobs after 
victory.  By October, the Big Three Allied powers had all signed the Declaration following 
representations from the signatories.    
Following this endorsement, the exiled governments further pushed both the British and 
US for the creation of a United Nations War Crimes Commission.17  Shortly after the meeting at 
St. James’s Palace in July 1942, the British government endorsed the creation of a ‘United 
Nations Commission on Atrocities’. Its function was declared to be fact-finding body and to 
produce reports. The British advised, however, that “[t]he suggestion of some sort of 
international court for the trial of war criminals is to be deprecated. Nor is it necessary or 
desirable to create a new body of international law, for war crimes are already sufficiently well 
defined”. 18 Nevertheless, Roosevelt issued a public declaration on 21 August 1942 stating:  
                                                
15 Punishment for War Crimes: The Inter-Allied Declaration Signed at St. James’s Palace London on 13th January, 
1942 and Relative Documents (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1942). 
16 Ibid., 7. 
17To put this use of the term ‘United Nations’ in context, it must be noted that the group of nations now commonly 
referred to as ‘The Allies’ formally called themselves, ‘The United Nations’ from 1 January 1942 onwards. For more 
information, see Plesch, America, Hitler and the UN (n 1). 
18 United States Department of State, ‘Foreign Relations of the United States diplomatic papers’ 1 General, British 
Commonwealth, The Far East (1942) 45ff. 
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The United Nations are going to win this war. When victory has been achieved, it is the 
purpose of the Government of the United States, as I know it is the purpose of each of the 
United Nations, to make appropriate use of the information and evidence in respect to these 
barbaric crimes of the invaders, in Europe and in Asia. It seems only fair that they should 
have this warning that the time will come when they shall have to stand in courts of law in 
the very countries which they are now oppressing and answer for their acts.19  
 
This and his subsequent statements and actions belie the oft repeated claim that he considered 
seriously mass executions of some 50,000 Nazis in the place of legitimate justice processes. 
In October 1942, the British and US formally endorsed the creation of a ‘United Nations 
Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes’.20 The name was later changed to the United 
Nations War Crimes Commission as operations began.  Negotiations on the terms of reference of 
the UNWCC took a year until its official creation 20 October 1943. A few days after the first 
meeting of the Commission, British, Soviet and US government representatives meeting in 
Moscow issued a declaration that set out the major powers’ general approach to war crimes. The 
Moscow Declaration was made on behalf of the United Nations alliance reserving the fate of the 
German leadership to the Big Three, but announcing the policy that stated that suspected Axis 
war criminals would be tried by and in the nations where they had committed their crimes and 
that crimes without clear geographical reference would be tried based on joint decisions by the 
Allied governments.21  
Despite this initial support from the Soviet government for the Moscow Declaration, the 
Soviet Union did not participate in the UNWCC for numerous reasons. The Soviet Union 
criticized the terms of reference of the UNWCC for not going far enough to investigate and 
punish suspected war criminals, and especially for not making preparation for committing a war 
of aggression and crimes against humanity into war crimes. The British refusal to accuse 
Rudolph Hess (The Deputy Fuhrer who had parachuted into Britain on a diplomatic mission in 
1941) of war crimes was also vehemently opposed by Moscow.22  The Soviet Union pursued its 
own war crimes trials.  
 
                                                
19 C. Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1948) 1184.   
20 Hansard, House of Lords, 17 December 1942, Col. 577.   
21Moscow Conference, Statement on Atrocities, October 1943, <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/moscow.asp> . 
22 A. J. Kochavi, (n 1 above) 222-230. 
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III.  CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COMMISSION 
 
The UNWCC member states were Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, France, 
Greece, India, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the United Kingdom, 
the United States and Yugoslavia. All actively participated in the Commission from the 
beginning of its operations or shortly thereafter.  South Africa was only involved in setting up the 
UNWCC and did not host national trials.  Denmark joined the UNWCC in July 1945. In February 
1944, a Commissioner suggested that Brazil and Mexico might join the UNWCC based on 
experiences of suffering, but neither country pursued membership.23 
   
 Upon its creation, the Commission was given three specific duties by the member 
countries:  
 
                                                
23 UNWCC, 11th mtg. at 1 (29 February 1944). 
Figure 1: Nations Involved in the UNWCC 
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1. To investigate and record the evidence of war crimes, identifying where possible 
the individuals responsible; 
2. To report to the governments concerned cases in which it appeared that adequate 
evidence might be expected to be forthcoming; 
3. To make recommendations to member governments concerning questions of law 
and procedure as necessary for them to be able to fulfil their role of conducting 
trials.24  
The Commission quickly organized into three committees that met weekly. The first committee 
(Committee I) was dedicated to facts and evidence. The second committee (Committee II) 
handled matters of enforcement and the third committee (Committee III) served as the forum for 
dialogue on legal affairs.  
The nations involved set up respective National Offices within their governments to liaise 
with the Commission, coordinate investigations, collect evidence and create new legal structures 
to handle war crimes where necessary.25 All of the National Offices reported directly to the main 
UNWCC headquarters in London as they conducted investigations and constructed lists of 
suspected war criminals for review from 1944 to the end of 1947. A National Offices Conference 
was held in London in May and June 1945.26 The conference discussed policy and practice for 
the pursuit and trial of war criminals and its papers include a number of municipal statutes for 
war crimes trials. As far as we are aware, the Commission conducted the only comparative 
analysis of the different national practices to take place during this time. This analysis is 
presented in a report the Commission submitted to the UN in 1948. The report provides a frankly 
incomplete assessment that invited more research.27 No additional research on the work of the 
national offices has been conducted to the best of our knowledge.    
 In addition to setting up national offices, some West European governments in exile in 
London created enabling legislation for war crimes courts. For example, by August 1943 
Belgium and the Netherlands had passed laws creating courts to try war crimes cases in their own 
                                                
24 History of the UNWCC (n 4).   
25 The Netherlands laws for the trial of war criminals were enacted in 1943 and the French in 1944. 
26 Minutes and papers of the UNWCC National Offices Conference. 
27 Information Concerning Human Rights Arising from Trials of War Criminals (n 5 above) 125-145 and Appendix. 
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countries.28 Through its committee structure, the UNWCC supported the National Offices in 
conducting their investigations and also investigated some cases on its own by maintaining a 
small staff team that also liaised with governments through the National Offices. 29  The 
Commission was ultimately responsible for issuing prima facie decisions on the cases brought to 
it by the national offices that resulted from their investigation efforts. These decisions were made 
through an ex parte process.30 The UK provided facilities for the Commission, but the staff was 
international and all member states contributed equally to funding the general operations and the 
operations of their respective National Offices. 
 




Member states only submitted cases that they wished included amongst the lists of accused, 
suspected war criminals and material witnesses. The UNWCC published all of the lists in their 
records. Where prosecutions resulted, states were encouraged to send summary trial reports to be 
recorded by Committee I. This process was incomplete at the time of the Commission’s hasty 
                                                
28 E/CN.14-AM9 (1948). For the Netherlands, see page 130 [Netherlands Extraordinary Penal Law Decree of 22 
December 1943 (Statute Book D. 61) and the Decrees of 22 December 1943, (Statute Book D. 62)]. For Belgium, 
see page 291. 
29 UNWCC, Internal Memo (18 Apr. 1945).  
30 Some criticism of this has been that it was based on hearsay evidence, a matter discussed by the UNWCC itself.  
See Information Concerning Human Rights Arising from Trials of War Criminals (n 1). It appears to us that the 
colloquial sense of ‘hearsay’ as gossip has been used to denigrate the work of the UNWCC as a whole. Also see the 
UNARMS application package for the UNWCC. 
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closure in 1948, with many countries being unable to complete and process their reports in time 
to be included in the Commission’s publications. 
The efforts of the National Offices and Committee I were complemented for a short time by 
the enforcement work of Committee II that was led by former US Congressman Ambassador 
Herbert Pell.31 Committee II’s work was initiated in the spring of 1944 when the UNWCC 
endorsed the proposal of several enforcement mechanisms. These mechanisms included a war 
crimes office in enemy territory32 that contributed to the creation of CROWCASS33 under the 
command of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary 
Force.34 Other initiatives include a detailed proposal for mixed military tribunals under the major 
allied commands that was later adopted35 by many states. In the specific case of the UK, the 
discussions within the Commission on how to bring accused war criminals to trial “ultimately 
resulted” in the issuing of the Royal Warrant and the creation of the British War Crimes 
Executive in July 1945.36   
Committee III was in operation for the duration of the existence of the Commission.  The 
work of Committee III was marked by the active participation of key members of the exile 
governments; the Committee received complex legal questions from the different nations in order 
to generate debate and ultimately arrive at decisions and recommendations for the practice of the 







                                                
31 See the contribution by G. Cox,in this volume.. 
32 UNWCC 21st mtg. at 3 (6 June 1944) and the accompanying UNWCC Doc. C24, as well as UNWCC 22d mtg. at 
3 (13 June 1944) and the accompanying UNWCC Doc. C30. 
33 CROWCASS is the Central Register of War Criminals and Security Suspects, Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Powers in Europe. 
34 UNWCC 32d mtg.at 2-7 (19 September 1944).  Also see UNWCC Doc. C 52(1) Recommendation in Favour of 
the Establishment by Supreme Military Commanders of Mixed Military Tribunals for the Trial of War Criminals. 
35 UNWCC 32d mtg. (19 September 1944). The Commission approved the adoption of a proposal for a United 
Nations War Crimes Court (See the accompanying UNWCC Doc. C49, Doc. C50 and Doc. C58 Explanatory 
Memorandum). 
36 Memorandum from the Treasury Solicitors Office for the Attorney General, (1945)  1,2,4. UK National Archives 
TS26, 897, 27-33. 













In addition to the national investigations and trials, the Commission helped design and initiate 
the establishment of military tribunals to address situations involving particularly complex crimes. 
Crimes addressed by military tribunals included incidences that didn’t have specific geographic 
locations and crimes committed against Allied nationals in Germany and across parts of the Far 
East under various forms of colonial administration.37 . The military authorities were primarily 
from the US and the UK and were also responsible for aiding their respective nations in 
investigations and holding trials. As well as meeting the need to address complex situations, the 
integration of military authorities was also due in part so that trials could be conducted “without 
waiting for the initiative of any one Government on the matter”.38 Collectively, Allied military 
authorities conducted a large number of trials around Europe and the Far East.39  
                                                
37 See the October 1945 Trial of Kapitanleutnant Heinz Eck and Four Others accused of killing crew members of the 
Greek steamship ‘Peleus’ in a British Military Court for the Trial of War Criminals. 
38 UNWCC, 33d Mtg. 33 at 6 (26 September 1944).  
39 The UNWCC’s reliance on military authorities was in part due to the UNWCC’s commitment to providing justice 
that was swift and effective. The meaning of this was debated among members throughout the existence of the 
UNWCC. The internal document ‘Recommendation in Favour of the Establishment by Supreme Military 
Commanders of Mixed Military Tribunals for the Trial of War Criminals’ of 26 September 1944 declared that the 
strategy would be used in part “…so that no criminals escape trial and punishment because of the inability to effect a 
speedy trial” (UNWCC Doc. C.52(1)).  In hesitation, French representative M. Gros addressed this idea in a written 
statement submitted at the UNWCC’s thirty-first meeting on 12 September 1944. His first point stated, “[a]lthough 
the notion of swift justice is found in manuals of military law, ‘justice’ is something that does not admit of qualifying 
adjectives”. Also see History of the UNWCC (n 1) 5. 
Figure 3: The UNWCC Committee and Sub-
Commission Structure 
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In addition to military tribunals and the National Offices, the Commission hosted a sub-
commission in the Far East.40 At the founding meeting in October 1943, China made a proposal 
to the members of the Commission for the creation of a Far Eastern and Pacific Sub-Commission 
to represent and conduct the work of the UNWCC in the Far East. 41 The Sub-Commission was 
created in June 1944. Its inaugural meeting was held on 29 November 1944 in Chungking, then 
the capital of China and it continued to operate through 1948.42 Approximately 90% of the cases 
presented to the Sub-Commission came from the Chinese national office. China went on to 
conduct war crimes tribunals in Nanking, Hangkow, Canton, Mukden, Taiyua, Peipine, Hsuchow, 
Tsinan, Shanghai and Formosa.43  
The UNWCC concluded its work at its headquarters in London as well as the National 
Offices in 1948. It is widely argued that the US and the UK exerted strong influence in the matter 
of hastily closing down the Commission.44 Chris Simpson and others argue convincingly that the 
main reason was to rehabilitate Nazis into Germany.45 In 1948 the Commission passed its records 
to the United Nations Organisation. In the same year, the Commission issued its report on the 
development of legal human rights standards following World War II. In this report, the UNWCC 
called for further research into the war crimes trials at the end of World War II by a range of 
academic disciplines.46 The intent was futile, for the entire archive was classified until 1987 when 
the rules of access were loosened in theory. However in practice, with a few exceptions, the 
entire archive remained closed to public access until recently.47   
In the fall of 2011, the United Nations Archives and Records Management Section 
(UNARMS) agreed to allow access to bona fide researchers to the majority of the archive 
including all of the meeting minutes and trial summaries. This adjustment in the enforcement of 
                                                
40 See the contribution of W. W. Lai in this volume. . 
41 See UNWCC 15th mtg. at 1-5 (25 April 1944); History of the UNWCC (n 1) 129.   
42 Ibid., 129. 
43 Ibid., 516.  
44 We rely on Chris Simpson’s analysis of the closure of the UNWCC.  He argues that the demise of the UNWCC 
was instigated by US officials in order to facilitate the rehabilitation of Nazis into the Western Zones of Germany. 
See C. Simpson, The Splendid Blond Beast: Money, Law and Genocide in the Twentieth Century  (Monroe, Maine, 
Common Courage Press, 1995), 13. 
45 See the contribution of C. Simpson in this volume. 
46 Information Concerning Human Rights Arising from Trials of War Criminals, (n 5 above) vi.  
47 In order to gain access to view the UNWCC archives at the United Nations Archives and Records Management 
Section, UN rules dictate that researchers must first write a letter to their national mission to the UN to explain their 
research and that it is bona fide. The UN mission then must write a letter to the office of the UN Secretary-General 
who has the final approval. For more information and the application and guidelines for access, see 
<https://archives.un.org/content/access-and-declassification> . The United States recently requested a copy of the 
entire UNWCC archive in partnership with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.   
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the rules came following efforts of the War Crimes Project at SOAS, University of London to 
open the archives.  Working in partnership with the War Crimes Project, the Office of the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has made this large section of the archive 
available to the wider public. The section that remains closed to the general public includes 
36,000 pre-trial charge files that detail various charges, witness statements and testimonies. 
Prior to the partial opening of the UNWCC archives held at UNARMS, various national 
archives also made sections of the Commission’s records public. These nations include the US, 
the UK and Australia among others. In October 2013, the US government announced that it was 
exercising its right as a member of the Commission to take a copy of the entire UNWCC archive, 
including the charge files, for the use of the US Holocaust Memorial Museum.   
 
 
IV. THE UNWCC’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
 
The UNWCC was the first multilateral initiative to successfully conduct widespread 
investigations into heinous crimes of war and provide structure to prosecute suspected war 
criminals in the modern period. This in and of itself amounts to remarkable action.  The work and 
structure of the Commission also serve as a rare example of constructive action and mobilization 
between nations during times of war concerning justice. The urgency of the times of war, in 
particular the influence of the exiled governments in this regard, prompted the US and the UK in 
particular to heed to the proposals of the Commission and actively participate.48 The practice of 
mobilization of multilateral collaboration and national investigations stands in direct contrast to 
subsequent international criminal justice efforts of the post-Cold War period. It is also important 
to note that the UNWCC considered a draft constitution for a United Nations International 
Criminal Court.49 The concept of developing an international criminal court was discussed in 
detail among members but was not adopted by member states.50  
                                                
48 A. J. Kochavi, (n 1 above) 4.  
49 See the contribution of W. Schabas in this volume.  
50 UNWCC, 33d mtg. at 6 (26 September 1944) and UNWCC Doc. C51 Draft Convention for the Establishment of a 
United Nations War Crimes Court (30 September 1944). 
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Another stark contrast to the international criminal tribunals of today is the Commission’s 
prioritization of quick and efficient tribunals. This was also due in large part to the overwhelming 
sense of urgency felt by the nations at the time. From the initial days of the designing of the 
UNWCC structure and operations, UK Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden specifically argued for 
trying and punishing suspects immediately after the war in part to ensure rapid justice and in part 
to prevent citizens from taking the law into their own hands. He acted through the desire to avert 
a situation involving prolonged trials that would delay the restoration of peace in Europe and the 
Far East.51   
By the time the UNWCC published its official history in 1948, 36,529 individuals and 
units had been charged by the governments and listed by the UNWCC.52 The Commission had 
received a total of 8,178 cases from the member governments.53 The number of people involved 
in the investigations of the Commission included 3,028 “war criminals and material witnesses” 
that were part of the Far East and Pacific Sub-Commission’s lists.54 In addition to these cases, 
governments that were not members of the Commission also submitted cases and individuals for 
its review.   
In History of the UNWCC, it is reported that approximately 2,000 associated trials took 
place around Europe and the Far East between the fall of 1945 and March of 1948 involving 
nearly 25,000 individuals. Many of the trials recorded in  History of the UNWCC involved more 
than one defendant, which was pursuant to the harsh and complicated nature of many of the 
crimes committed during the war particularly in occupied territories. It states further that the 
2,000 trials resulted in verdicts of death sentences and imprisonment for over 24,000 “minor” 
criminals of World War II.55 Some 5,193 individuals were acquitted by the National Office trials 
and 148 cases were “not accepted”56 because Committee I was not satisfied that there was 
sufficient evidence to justify a prosecution of the persons or units charged.57 In these cases, 
nations were often asked by Committee I to present more evidence for further consideration 
before the case was dropped.   
 
                                                
51 A.J. Kochavi (n 1) 30. 
52 History of the UNWCC  (n 1) 509. 
53 Ibid., 508. 
54 Ibid., 514. 
55 Ibid., 518. 
56 Ibid.  
57 Ibid.,531. 
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V. THE DEVELOPMENT OF KEY INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
ISSUES 
 
The details of the national investigations and trials provide significant insight into the work of the 
Commission and the responsibility of its members in developing key aspects of international 
criminal law. Indeed, the accomplishments of the UNWCC also involve the Commission’s work 
on specific complex issues of international criminal law, many of which remain contentious 
today. In this section, we provide short summaries of some of the three primary issues that the 
Commission included in its investigations and trials: the crime of aggression, the defense of 
superior orders and issues around environmental Degradation.  Additional key issues are 
addressed in articles included in this symposium.   
 
 
5.1. The Crime of Aggression 
 
The issue of the crime of aggression was present in the Commission’s debates from the very 
beginning of its operations. The members recorded in History of the UNWCC that “[b]y far the 
most important issue of substantive law to be studied by the Commission and its Legal 
Committee was the question of whether aggressive war amounted to a criminal act”.58 Faced with 
complex questions related to the underdeveloped and highly contentious topic in the complex 
context of World War II, the Commission sought legal ground in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 
1928. The Kellogg-Briand Pact sought to address the concept of aggressive war, explicitly stating 
that the contracting parties “condemn recourse to war for the solution of international 
controversies”59 and agree that settlement and solution for all disputes and conflicts should be 
sought only through pacific means.60    
In History of the UNWCC, the members argued that in the context of the World War II, 
“there are clear precedents for the rule that it is an unlawful act to start and wage an aggressive 
war. It has indeed been long held by humanity that he who does such a thing is guilty of a 
                                                
58 Ibid., 180. 
59 Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, Article I.   
60 Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, Article II.   
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supreme offense”.61 Despite the seemingly clear legal support for the launching and waging of a 
war of aggression being against international law, the political situation of the time limited the 
advancement of this principle just as it does today and is was not until after the London Charter 
was concluded in August 1945 that the principle of aggressive war was endorsed by the 
Commission.62  
However, the August 1946 trial of Takashi Sakai conducted by the UNWCC supported 
Chinese War Crimes Military Tribunal in Nanking is evidence of the Commission’s support for 
the concept on legal grounds. The Japanese military commander was charged with crimes against 
peace and crimes against humanity. His incitement of numerous aggressive acts of atrocity 
against Chinese civilians while working in the country is directly referenced in the trial report. He 
was found guilty “of participating in the war of aggression” and sentenced to death.63  
Following the debate within the Commission and the Sakai trial, Wright stated in History 
of the UNWCC, “I am quite satisfied that in the future, even though other forces may temporarily 
and on occasion prevail, the nations of the world will not let the principle go”.64  However, it is 
clear that issues surrounding the crime of aggression continue to be contentious even in a 
contemporary context. This is most clearly demonstrated by the ambiguous nature of the 
conclusions of the Kampala Conference in 2010 that presented the ICC with the opportunity to 
incorporate the concept into the Rome Statute. While a historic agreement was reached on the 
adoption of a definition of the concept65, the ICC will not be able to enforce the crime until 2017 
at the earliest.   
The Trial of Takashi Sakai does not provide indisputable precedent on the crime of 
aggression; however, it does represent support for the adoption of the principle that remains 
relevant today. Additional precedent may be found in the national legislation for war crimes 
tribunals and in national practice. A question for further research is whether China pursued case 
other than the Sakai case on the basis of the charge of making aggressive war or crimes against 
                                                
61 History of the UNWCC (n 1) 17. 
62 UNWCC, 77th Mtg 77, see earlier discussions at M35, M36, M41.  
63 Trial of Takashi Sakai, United Nations War Crimes Commission, XIV Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 1, 
Case No. 83, Chinese War Crimes Military Tribunal of the Ministry of National Defence, Nanking, 29 August 1946. 
64 History of the UNWCC (n 1) 10. 
65The Kampala Conference defined the crime of aggression as “the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by 
a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an 
act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the 
United Nations”. 
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peace. Both the Yugoslav and Greek courts were empowered to pursue these types of cases.66 
The London Charter for the IMT influenced the subsequent provisions of the US Military 
Tribunals and regulations in the Pacific and China although it is not clear whether these 
provisions were enacted.67 These Balkan and Asian examples of municipal practice indicate a 
wider application of crimes against peace than is usually assumed. 
 
5.2. The Defence of Superior Orders 
 
The question of the validity of the defense of superior orders was also debated throughout the 
duration of the Commission. The Commission was unanimous that “the mere fact of having acted 
in obedience to the orders of a superior does not of itself relieve a person who has committed a 
war crime from responsibility”, though it did not seek to impose this view on its members.68 
Many individuals accused in the national trials pled the defense of superior orders in their trials. 
These pleas were often anticipated by the members of the Commission and highlighted in 
numerous debates seeking to address “the extent to which persons pledged by law to obey orders 
of their superiors, in particular those issued by heads of State and Governments, were to be held 
personally responsible for acts committed by them in in subordinate positions”.69 The issue was 
viewed as significant enough that Committee III appointed a small sub-committee to address the 
issue and reach solutions.   
Historical contention around the issue complicated the duty of the Commission to clarify 
the principle. There is at least one circumstance at the Leipzig Trials of the acquittal of an officer 
of sinking a hospital ship on the grounds that he had acted in obedience to orders from a superior. 
German law at that time held that the defence of superior orders was valid.70 After great amounts 
of debate, the official statement of the Commission was, “civil and military authorities cannot be 
relieved from responsibility by the mere fact that a higher authority might have been convicted of 
the same offence. It will be for the court to decide whether a plea of superior orders is sufficient 
                                                
66 Information Concerning Human Rights Arising from Trials of War Criminals (n 5) 288, 295-297. 
67 Ibid., 158. 
68 Report to the Governments on the Plea of Superior Orders, UNWCC, C86, M54,2. 
69 History of the UNWCC (n 1) 263. 
70 See the case of Lieutenant-Commander Karl Neumann, commander of the submarine U. 67 and the case of the 
sinking of the Hospital Ship ‘Dover Castle’ on 26 May 1917.   
	   19	  
to acquit the person charged from responsibility”. 71 Along these lines, one of the key issues that 
the Commission addressed in its discussions was the legal conundrum presented by traditional 
standards of immunity for state officials and the ubiquitous practice of state officials issuing 
orders to subordinates to engage in illegal action. This discussion is echoed in the Commission’s 
report to the UN in 1948.72 This report also discusses criminal liability for keeping watch while a 
crime is committed, passing on orders, participating in lynching, instigating crime and common 
design.73 Ultimately, Wright expressed in his introduction to History of the UNWCC, that “I think 
it can now be taken as settled that [the] plea is not a sufficient defence but that it may have effect 
by way of extenuation”.74 
 
5.3. Environmental Degradation 
 
As the Commission was closing its operations in 1948, the Polish government brought forth two 
cases involving degradation of forestland for review. While the case never reached trial due to the 
closure of the UNWCC, the notes to the charge file shed light on this issue before the 
Commission. The representatives specifically asked for the Commission to determine whether or 
not the suspected criminals could be charged with war crimes for their policies and actions.  In a 
charge file received first by the Commission on 11 December 1947 and again in revised form on 
20 January 1948, the Polish national office accused eleven people of pillage of public forests as a 
war crime. The people accused included the chief of the forestry department of the region in 
question, as well as the head forestry administrators in Kracow, Warsaw and Radom. The date of 
the alleged crime included acts committed during the duration of office as heads of respective 
departments of the Forestry Administration in Poland under the German Occupation from 1939 – 
1944. The individuals are specifically accused of taking part in having “wrought a tremendous 
devastation to Polish forests”75 The charge file claims that this had a significant economic impact 
on the country due to sizeable losses in revenue due to the stolen timber.   
A second case filed on 18 December 1947 accused another Nazi in the occupying force of 
“wanton destruction of public property” specifically for “ill-treat[ing] the Poles without any 
                                                
71 History of the UNWCC (n 1) 138. 
72 UN E/CN.14-AM9 (1948)  217-236. 
73 Ibid.,  212-216. 
74 History of the UNWCC (n 1) 11. 
75 Please insert reference. 
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reason whatsoever and allow[ing] for devastation of forests” in his capacity as deputy director of 
the district of Garwolin, Poland during the period of 1943 – 1944.76  It was alleged that all of the 
individuals involved in the two cases used the positions of power that they occupied to promote 
the irresponsible cutting of excessive amounts of Poland’s forestry. This occurred to the 
detriment of the environment as well as the Polish economy, the accusations contend. The 
Commission was able to get as far as determining that prima facie evidence existed suggesting 
that a war crime was committed.  Nine of the individuals were accused in the first case and listed 
as war criminals by the Commission.77 Further research needs to be conducted into whether 
Poland conducted the trial of the nine accused.  
 In the past several decades “blood diamonds” and “agent orange” have become common 
phrases associated with war and the environment as well as economic gain. Currently, control of 
access to natural resources continues to provoke conflict between nations and armed groups 
around the world. Resource plunder is blamed for causing devastation related to environmental, 
economic and health-related well-being of millions of people and natural spaces. Millions of lives 
have been lost as well as millions of dollars and millions of acres of natural land. Despite the 
devastating realities of environmental crimes committed during the wars in the former 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Cambodia, none of the international ad-hoc tribunals 
have issued charges related to environmental degradation.  
 The Rome Statute of the ICC contains a possible basis to prosecute elements of 
environmental degradation as part of war crimes law. Article 8(2) addresses the protection of 
private and public property against pillage during times of war. Article 8(2)(a)(iv) prohibits 
“[e]xtensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and 
carried out unlawfully and wantonly”. Article 8(2)(b)(iii) outlaws indiscriminate attacks, i.e. 
“intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of 
life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe 
damage to the natural environment which would clearly be excessive in relation to the concrete 
and direct overall military advantage anticipated”. These actions are considered to be war crimes 
over which the Court has jurisdiction. While these two provisions demonstrate commitment by 
the ICC to prosecute pillage of public property occurring in both international and national 
                                                
76 Please insert reference. 
77 History of the UNWCC (n 1) 496. 
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conflicts, both reference possible exceptions. In the case of Article 8(2)(a)(iv) for justification 
“by military necessity” and in the case of Article 8(2)(b)(iii) for acts “excessive in relation 
to…military advantage anticipated”.  Currently no criminal cases concerning resource plunder or 
environmental degradation have been presented to the ICC. 
 There is legal precedent for the prosecution of pillage of private and public property as a 
war crime including in cases of the UNWCC and its inclusion in the Rome Statute.78 However, 
this case that was brought to the UNWCC’s attention specifically for environmental damage is 
cause for consideration of this principle on separate grounds that would recognize the 
environmental implications of such crimes in addition to the economic factors inherent in charges 
of pillage of private and public property.   
 
VI.  CRITICISMS 
 
It is important to note that several criticisms plagued the UNWCC throughout its operation and 
following its closure. On the one hand, sections of the US and UK governments dedicated little 
time for the idea of war crimes trials including for an international process, and this was reflected 
in their commitment. On the other, the Commission was criticized precisely because it was not a 
fully functional system of law and order, apprehending suspects and bringing them to trial. 
Another general criticism of the Commission was that it had to conduct most of its work in secret 
due to security issues concerning the timing and scale of its work. This factor is especially 
evident when the Commission is compared to the IMTs, as the IMTs acted for the world to try 
the more notorious criminals and were backed by hefty budgets and public attention. 
Perhaps the most significant criticism was that the Commission’s limited power did not 
include the executive capacity to prosecute war criminals directly, which led to a significant 
reliance on the different governments to execute trials and achieve justice.  This specific factor 
has generated criticism that the practices of the nations were not entirely uniform or consistent as 
each had very different economic and political capacities following the war. Historian Dr. Effie 
                                                
78 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2002) 2187 UNTS 90, Articles 8(2) (b) (xvi), 8(2) (e) (v),. 
For a study of legal precedents, see J. Stewart, ‘Corporate War Crimes: Prosecuting the Pillage of Natural Resources’, 
(2011), Annex 1,  <http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/pillage-manual-2nd-edition-2011.pdf>; 
L. van den Herik & D. Dam-De Jong, ‘Revitalizing the Antique War Crime of Pillage: The Potential and Pitfalls of 
Using International Criminal Law to Address Illegal Resource Exploitation’ (2011) 22 Criminal Law Forum  237-
273.  
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Pedaliu argues that the process of putting war criminals on trial was slowed down considerably 
because the UNWCC was merely an advisory body with no executive powers. 79  
Related to this are general criticisms about the legal processes employed by the different 
nations operating under the umbrella of the UNWCC. These include lack of appeal options for 
people convicted in the trials and the investigation and judicial processes that are viewed by some 
critics as hasty. The UNWCC and the IMTs are all criticised as exemplifying victors’ justice. 
Certainly if there had been no victory there would have been no trials and as far as it went, justice. 
However, it is clear that all the states concerned from the St James’s Declaration onwards 
focused political energy on exactly this issue. They rejected mob rule, warned the enemy they 
would be placed on trial, chose to subject their national prosecutions to international approval, 
constructed standards of evidence, agreed recommendations on what was and was not an 
international crime in extensive detail, rejected some proposed prosecutions and when trials were 
conducted acquitted a significant number of defendants. In all of this they sought and achieved 
their strategic goal of demonstrating the civilized nature of their states in contrast to those of their 
attackers.  
 We recognize that general context marked by a deep sense of urgency and the political 
dynamics of the World War II /early Cold War period stinted the UNWCC’s ability to function 
and its overall success. The most obvious of these is the Soviet Union’s refusal to participate in 
the Commission and their establishment of an independent entity to address war crimes. Less 
obvious, but argued publicly by Herbert Pell at the time and most recently by Cox and Simpson 
in this symposium, are the negative influences of dominant sections of the US and British 
governments that grew in intensity throughout the life of the Commission. Kochavi calls 
“Britain’s differences of opinion with the Soviets”80 a downside of the Commission.   
Finally, the hasty and premature close of the UNWCC generated confusion and criticism 
at the time and also into the future. The closure led to the incomplete recording of statistics about 
the national and military trials and the number of people involved in investigations. In its final 
document sent to the UN in 1948 and in History of the UNWCC, the Commission’s members 
acknowledged many of the limitations and urged further study of the work that had been 
                                                
79 E. G. H. Pedaliu ‘Britain and the “Hand-over” of Italian War Criminals to Yugoslavia, 1945-1948’ (2004), 39 
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achieved. The fact that this never happened is itself powerful evidence of the influence of those 




The main legacy of the Commission can be summed up with the cliché that Nuremberg was just 
the tip of the iceberg of international criminal prosecutions at the end of World War II. Based on 
the work of the Commission, global governance in the present century fosters debate regarding 
the political will to pursue suspected war criminals, not against the benchmark of Tokyo and 
Nuremburg, but against the standard that dozens of agencies, courts and tribunals pursued tens of 
thousands of cases of international crimes against individuals at all levels of authority. While 
existing literature related to World War II and the prosecution of Axis war criminals generally 
gives the UNWCC only scarce attention and recognition, the Commission’s actual influence in 
this period is significant. It is true that not all war criminals of both major and mid-level stature 
faced prosecution following the end of the war. However, it is certain that while some escaped, 
many were subjected to trials and punishment. This is particularly important when viewed 
alongside the largely unsuccessful efforts to initiate international criminal justice efforts after 
World War I. Indeed, fair trials and punishment are regarded as central to international criminal 
law seventy years later.   
Decisions and opinions of the UNWCC carried the weight of the participating states.  
This stands in direct contrast to the Four-Power London Charter for the IMT that was adhered to 
without substantive input by other states. It also stands in contrast to the Control Order 10 
processes that carried the weight of one or several states. It is important to note that the military 
tribunal cases such as those known as the Belsen and Dachau trials were given prima facie 
approval by all of the members of the Commission adding the to strength of the legal process. 
The advocacy of improved prosecution today may be assisted by reminding governments where 
their historic policy and practice was in advance of that of today, especially where the experience 
of World War II has assumed a foundational and defining part of national culture. 
One key legacy of the UNWCC is its direct influence on the Nuremberg Charter and 
subsequently the proceedings at Nuremberg and Tokyo. The support that the Commission 
provided to Nuremberg is rarely referenced in modern literature concerning the topic. Indeed, 
	   24	  
Justice Robert Jackson visited the Commission in London during the summer of 1945 and cited 
specific issues debated by the Commission that he planned to adopt at Nuremberg.81 The 
Commission demonstrates that issues of race and gender are important in twenty first century 
considerations of judicial processes for international crimes. While more research is needed, it is 
clear that both dimensions were present in the 1940s in ways that are not usually recognized. One 
important example of this is China and India’s active participation in the UNWCC operations. 
Both of the countries consistent involvement in the general Commission meetings as well as the 
Committee meetings provides a substantial non-Western contribution. China took a leading role 
in the investigation and trial work conducted in the Far East through its leadership of the work of 
the Far East Sub-Commission.82 Despite not being an independent state, India had representation 
on the UNWCC from the very beginning of its operations and remained active even after it 
gained independence in 1947. Indian judges also participated in some of the tribunals in the Far 
East.83  
As is discussed, gender based crimes were pursued at this time, but it is also important to 
note that women were also active members of the Commission and served in some occasions as 
national representatives. The minutes of the Commission show the governments of Denmark, 
France and the Netherlands were at various times represented by women.84 
 
VIII. THE FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA 
 
The contemporary research into the work of the UNWCC and its associated courts and tribunals 
has several components. The most important is to empower advocacy for the international and 
national enforcement of punishment for international crimes against human rights as an objective 
in its own right and as a means of fulfilling the intent of the Commissioners themselves. This 
work requires an application of the work of the practices of the 1940s, where they are appropriate 
to present day conditions based on a growing understanding of those past practices. This 
understanding requires a full compilation and synthesis of archival material especially including 
                                                
81 For more information about the UNWCC’s contribution to the Nuremberg trials, see History of the UNWCC (n 1) 
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82 Ibid., 130.   
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the pre-trial files prepared for the Commission by states setting out charges and the records of 
subsequent trials.   
 There is also great relevance in evaluating the operational structure of the UNWCC in the 
context of the tribunals in operation today, specifically the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
(ECCC). Specific points for further research and comparison on the organizational aspects 
include the subject of a global system of complementary justice that effectively supports attempts 
being made by municipal authorities, overall costs of operation, the duration of trials and the 
interplay between international and national systems of justice. The requirements of fair trials 
was given much attention by the Commission and any analyses of those it supported should 
include both contemporary practice outside the arena of war crimes and the not unproblematic 
practices of today. Wright wrote that “[i]t was widely felt that justice should not be delayed”85 
specifically citing on other occasions that delays would mean complications and “escape of [the] 
guilty”.86  Most UNWCC-supported trials lasted between four and five days to three weeks. 
Another aspect not addressed in the articles in this symposium and worth further study is 
the attention given by the UNWCC to mid-level criminals. This upholds the principles of 
international criminal law of deterrence and achievement of justice; senior-level authoritarians do 
not plan and wage aggressive war by themselves. As a result of this priority, the UNWCC 
performed the largest role in addressing Nazi war crimes.  Currently, it is widely acknowledged 
that the UN tribunals are moving away from mid-level criminals and are focusing primarily on 




While worthy of some criticism and skepticism, the UNWCC does not deserve to be neglected by 
historical narratives that are often influenced to a great degree by political manoeuvring. Its 
accomplishments are many, in particular when viewed in context of the scale and scope of the 
destruction of World War II and the great needs required to bring justice to the international 
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community. Indeed, states party to the Commission made a number of specific and enduring 
advances in international criminal law. Some of these we have discussed elsewhere or are the 
subject other articles in this symposium or both; some which we introduce here and some which 
we mention as part of the future research agenda. Our and our colleagues research address the 
crimes of aggression87, crimes against humanity88, collective responsibility89, sexual violence90, 
torture91, the development of an international criminal court92, systems of complementary 
justice93 and facts and evidence94. 
 We hope that this overview of the work and structure of the Commission and the 
accompanying articles in thissymposium serve to draw attention to the UNWCC, its relevance to 
current debates and the need for further study of the trials that it supported as well as the legal 
discussions it fostered. With this deepened insight, we believe that greater precedent will be 
uncovered for the upholding of human rights standards in the context of conflict by the 
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